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Abstract 
In Italy, the Lega obtained outstanding electoral success in the 2019 European elections, becoming the first 
party on the political spectrum. Previous literature has argued that this performance can be attributed to the 
leadership of Matteo Salvini, who transformed the Lega from an ethno-regionalist party into a national right-wing 
party (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). Previous research has also argued that the recent geographical trajectories 
of the party’s success might be associated with the prevalence of a neo-fascist minority during the First Republic 
(e.g. Mancosu, 2015). However, the empirical evidence comes from aggregate official results and focuses only 
on some specific Italian regions of the so-called ‘red-zone’. By employing multilevel models on survey data, this 
paper tests whether this expectation holds also at the individual level, and in a larger geographical area. The 
findings show that individual propensities to vote for the Lega in 2019 are associated with the percentage of 
votes obtained more than forty years ago by the Movimento Sociale Italiano in the municipality where the re-
spondent lives, but only in central and southern Italian regions, in which the Lega was an irrelevant competitor 
before Salvini’s leadership. These findings provide additional evidence concerning the ideological drivers of pref-
erences for the Lega. 
1. Introduction 
n Italy, the most relevant outcome of the 2019 European Elections was the outstand-
ing consensus for the Lega, which obtained more than 9 million votes, equal to 34% of 
valid votes. Since its foundation about thirty years ago, the Lega, for the first time, has 
become the most supported party on the political landscape at the national level. The re-
sult is even more stunning when considering the party’s strong ethno-regionalist 
background, rooted in the northern part of the country. We should also consider that the 
Lega’s best performance at the national level before the leadership of Matteo Salvini, who 
became leader of the party in December 2013, was far lower than the most recent one – 
dating back to the 1996 national elections, when 3.8 million people voted for Lega Nord 
(about 10% of valid votes).  
Until a few years ago, the electoral performance of the Lega could be depicted by 
the metaphor of an expanding and contracting lung, always confined to the northern 
regions of the country (Segatti and Vezzoni, 2011). In political times characterized by 
I 
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the relative stability of the political system, the Lega reduced its area of consensus and 
maintained some support only around its strongholds. In more unstable political pe-
riods (e.g. the 1992 and 1996 elections, characterized by significant political turmoil), 
support for the Lega overcame its traditional boundaries by reaching some peripheral 
areas of its territorial basin, such as some provinces of Emilia-Romagna. In the last 
electoral cycle, pundits and academics have observed the increasing nationalization 
of the Lega, which largely increased its consensus in the red area in the 2015 regional 
elections and, starting from the 2018 national elections, became a relevant political 
actor even in central and southern regions. 
This paper relies on the strand of literature that posits the relevance of mecha-
nisms of behavioural path dependence to understanding social and political facts (e.g. 
Diamanti, 2003; Acharya et al., 2018). According to this literature, individual atti-
tudes and behaviours are partially related to a self-reinforcing set of geographically-
located behaviours and attitudes that persist over time. Similarly to institutional path 
dependence (Putnam et al., 1993), behavioural path dependence literature argues that 
attitudes are passed down through generations, by means of grass-roots learning 
mechanisms (in this respect, the role of primary socialization is crucial) and by local 
social structures (schools, churches, associations, etc.) that persist in the territory 
(Sani, 1976; Wittenberg, 2006; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Acharya et al., 2018). As 
a result, we are able to trace a certain political culture – defined geographically – back 
to its roots by identifying the characteristics of the same geographical place several 
decades (or even centuries) before. 
Scholars have stressed that the success of the Lega is, among other things, related to 
the rapid change in the party agenda enacted by the new leader, Matteo Salvini, who 
aimed to transform what was originally an ethno-regionalist party into an extreme right-
wing national one (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). In this regard, the Lega started adopting 
a totally new set of claims and communication strategies, sometimes appealing to a nar-
rative that resonates with that of the neo-fascist parties of the First Republic (above all, 
the Movimento Sociale Italiano, MSI). According to previous studies (Mancosu, 2015; 
Mancosu and Ladini, 2018), in regions in which the Lega has never obtained a sufficient 
level of support because of its former ethno-regionalist structure, this new – more ex-
treme and nationalist – rhetoric might have been particularly appealing for voters living 
in areas with a stronger neo-fascist political tradition. The present paper aims to test the 
patterns of geographical diffusion of the ‘new’ Lega in central and southern Italian re-
gions by providing, among others, a contextual-level explanation of the success of 
Salvini’s Lega. 
We combine survey data at the individual level with official data at the contextual 
level to show that, in the centre-south of Italy, individual propensities to vote for the Lega 
during the 2019 election campaign are positively correlated with the electoral perfor-
mance of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (measured more than forty years ago) in the 
municipality where the respondents live. 
The paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the success of the Lega 
in the 2019 European elections beyond its traditional borders, illustrates the shift in the 
communication strategy of the party, and describes the possible social mechanisms fos-
tering the party’s diffusion trajectories. The third section explains data, variables and 
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models employed in the paper; the fourth section presents the results and the fifth draws 
some conclusions and suggests some limitations of the paper. 
2. Background 
2.1. The Lega beyond its borders 
Previous studies have provided various explanations for the increased performance of the 
Lega on the political spectrum and the overcoming of its traditional borders (Mancosu, 
2015; Albertazzi et al., 2018; Mancosu and Ladini, 2018; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). 
Nonetheless, these explanations agree that the success of the Lega is largely dependent 
on the shift in the party’s rhetoric carried out by Matteo Salvini. Since he took office, the 
new leader of the party has characterized his political action by transforming the Lega 
from a somewhat traditional right-wing regionalist party (Tarchi, 1998), into a na-
tional/nationalist right-wing party (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018) 
radically based on anti-immigrant and anti-EU rhetoric.  
As outlined by Passarelli and Tuorto (2018, 90), although the Lega started to move 
towards the right in the mid-1990s, the leadership of Salvini ‘sped up’ the process of rad-
icalization of the party. This strategy was intended to increase the potential electoral 
basin of the Lega, with the realization that, among the Italian population, anti-immigra-
tion attitudes are widespread (Sniderman et al., 2002; Vezzoni, 2018) and anti-EU 
attitudes have substantially increased in the last 20 years (see Albertazzi, 2016; Brunazzo 
and Della Sala, 2016; Serricchio, 2018).  
Moreover, the refugee crisis which led to the arrival of about 600,000 immigrants 
in Italy from 2014 to 2017 contributed to making the voice of the Lega louder on the im-
migration issue. In this respect, we should outline that the salience of this issue 
dramatically increased between 2013, when only 4% of Italians considered it as the first 
or second Italian problem, and 2018, when the percentage rose to 23% (Vezzoni, 2018). 
By shifting its main enemy from Rome to Brussels (Brunazzo and Gilbert, 2017) and 
avoiding attacks against southern Italians (largely present in the first incarnation of the 
party, Lega Nord), Salvini’s Lega has been successful in going beyond its traditional geo-
graphical boundaries.  
Starting from the last election of the pre-Salvini era – the 2013 national elections in 
which the share of votes for the Lega was around 4% – the positive trend of party support 
has led the Lega to largely increase its consensus at every election (obtaining 6% of valid 
votes in the 2014 European elections, 17% during the 2018 national elections, and 34% in 
the 2019 European elections). To appreciate the effectiveness of the Lega’s strategy, Ta-
ble 1 compares the percentages of valid votes for the Lega before and after the 
appointment of Matteo Salvini as leader of the party in two European elections (2019 and 
2009 in which, incidentally, party performance was above the historical average up to 
that moment).1 
 
1 The five areas considered refer to the Istat geographical categorization, where the northwest is com-
posed of Valle d’Aosta, Liguria, Piemonte and Lombardia, northeast includes Veneto, Friuli, Trentino-
Alto Adige and Emilia-Romagna, Centre includes Toscana, Marche, Umbria and Lazio, South includes 
Abruzzo, Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Campania, and Calabria, and Islands comprise Sicily and Sardegna. 
We decided not to employ the geopolitical categorization (Galli, 1968), in order to keep separate Emilia 
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Table 1. Voting percentages for the Lega in 2009 and 2019 European Elections in Italy 
 Lega Nord 2009 Lega 2019  
Geographical area (pre-Salvini) (post-Salvini) Delta 
North-West 19.4 40.7 110% 
North-East 19 41 116% 
Centre 3 33.5 1017% 
South 0.6 23.5 3817% 
Islands 0.4 22.4 5500% 
Italy 10.2 34.3 236% 
 
In addition to the party’s growth in its strongholds (in which the Lega doubled its 
strength in the northeast and northwest), the most stunning performance is the increase 
in support in places in which the party was substantially irrelevant 10 years ago (becom-
ing 11 times larger in the centre, 39 times in the south and 56 times in the islands). We 
can thus say that the 2019 European elections consolidated the new geographical pattern 
which started at the beginning of Salvini’s office. 
2.2. A neo-fascist inheritance? 
Why did this operation become so effective? The new era of the Lega comes in a moment 
of crisis of the centre-right coalition, which began with the economic crisis of 2011. The 
progressive erosion of the image and political credibility of the main shareholder of the 
centre-right coalition, Silvio Berlusconi, and his personal party Forza Italia, combined 
with the corruption scandal that involved the former leader of Lega Nord, Umberto Bossi, 
in 2012, allowed new actors to exploit the potential of this political space. 
If, on the one hand, the opening of this political space has been crucial in the new 
success of the Lega, on the other it is also important to understand what kind of claims 
and communication strategies filled this political gap. Salvini’s communication, since 
the very beginning of his office, has been aggressive and mainly based on negative cam-
paigning (Bracciale and Martella, 2017), aimed at targeting a certain number of enemies 
of his potential electoral constituency (immigrants, NGOs, intellectuals, and everything 
that might recall the ‘left’ or the ‘outgroup’) and repeatedly attacking them on every me-
dium at his disposal.  
The communication strategy enacted by the new leadership was also characterized 
by a certain ‘hidden’ openness to even more extreme positions, a form of scantily dis-
guised sympathy towards more extreme right-wing parties and, in general, to the neo-
fascist area. For instance, as noticed by De Giorgi and Tronconi (2018, 341), ‘While the 
use of violence by [...] extreme right groups was apparently condemned, [...] the League 
[...] often justified episodes of racism and xenophobia that took place during the course of 
2017, placing the blame ultimately on the various governments in office over recent years 
and the decisions they took on immigration’. Other examples can be traced back by em-
ploying the direct communication of its leader via social media, often characterized by 
 
Romagna, where the Lega was a relevant competitor even before Salvini’s leadership (Passarelli and 
Tuorto, 2012, 2018), and the other regions belonging to the ‘red zone’, where the Lega obtained a very low 
consensus in the pre-Salvini period (see Mancosu and Ladini, 2018). 
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positive referencing to the public works done during the so-called ‘Ventennio’ (the 1922-
1943 period of fascist dictatorship, see Rame, 2018). Although this communication style 
could be interpreted as a form of tactical ‘dog-whistle politics’ (Haney-Lòpez, 2014), in-
stead of a clear endorsement of the dictatorship, the subtle but insistent references to the 
fascist regime and its most important characters might have produced some effect on the 
resilient minority of Italian voters that look with sympathy and nostalgia on the Venten-
nio period as a ‘golden age’ of order, discipline and security (see Castelli Gattinara, 2018). 
This shift toward the right in the rhetoric of the party was also reflected in the profile of 
the voters of the Lega. According to the Itanes data, while in the mid-1990s, on average, 
voters of Lega Nord located themselves at the centre of the left-right (0-10) scale, their 
average values increased from 6.8 to 7.8 from 2001 to 2013, and to 8.2 in 2018 (Passarelli 
and Tuorto, 2018). 
In this respect, several studies have argued that the Lega diffusion trajectories in the 
last 5 years might be partially explained by the more extremist and nationalist turn oper-
ated by Salvini. In some of these studies (Mancosu, 2015; Mancosu and Ladini, 2018), it 
is shown, by means of aggregate analyses, that places in which the performance of the 
‘new’ Lega was stronger are also those contexts in which the neo-fascist minority, meas-
ured by means of the support for the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) in the ‘70s, was 
strong as well.  
As concerns the social mechanism that might explain this empirical evidence, we 
move in the wake of the strand of literature aimed at explaining political and electoral be-
haviour by means of patterns of ‘behavioural path dependence’ (Acharya et al., 2018). 
Analogously to path dependence in institutions (see, above all, Putnam et al., 1993) this 
strand of literature argues that attitudes and behaviours become, in some way, self-rein-
forcing: once a path of development is embedded in the political culture of a certain 
geographical space, it becomes increasingly harder to erase. Similarly to institutions like 
language, religion and rituals, attitudes are passed down from generation to generation, 
encouraged by families and mechanisms of primary socialization and by social struc-
tures, such as schools, churches, political and non-political institutions rooted in the 
territory (see Acharya et al., 2018). Many examples which suggest behavioural path de-
pendence can be traced back in the literature: Voigtländer and Voth (2012) show that the 
Nazi Party’s support in 1933 elections was higher in places that had Jewish pogroms dur-
ing the fourteenth century (showing a persistence in behaviour of almost 500 years); 
Wittenberg (2006), by analyzing voting behaviour in Hungary before and after the com-
munist period, shows that the performance of right-wing parties after communism was 
higher in areas in which right-wing parties had higher consensus during the pre-com-
munist period. 
The social mechanism argued in these studies is somewhat similar to theories ex-
plaining the persistence over time of scattered zones of political influence in Italy: areas 
with a strong communist or Christian-democratic tradition during the First Republic 
were usually characterized by a stronger activism of militants of the local majority party, 
as well as a stronger presence of associations connected to the party itself (Bellucci and 
Segatti, 2010). Moreover, in these areas, it was more likely that the primary socialization, 
operated by the family of origin, was more able to convey a precise set of values compatible 
with the ideology of the dominant party.  
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In our case, the mechanisms argued here have a probabilistic component. Given cer-
tain contextual conditions, a larger quota of the local electoral body will be more likely to 
accept a neo-fascist rhetoric if the characteristics of the context are exogenously more 
permeable to such rhetoric. What has been argued in the previous literature, thus, is that 
the shift of the communication operated by Salvini could have contributed to triggering 
parts of the electoral body that were exogenously prone to accepting this type of rhetoric 
(and that one of the more prompt measures to identify the exogenous propensity to accept 
it is the prevalence of the neo-fascist right in a previous period). We need to outline that 
since support for the MSI during the First Republic was far lower than that for the 
Democrazia Cristiana and Partito Comunista Italiano, its political tradition could be re-
ferred to as a ‘minority political tradition’ (Mancosu and Ladini, 2018). Moving from the 
suggestion of Sani (1976, 394), who argued that the ‘search for contextual forces shaping 
political attitudes should not be limited only to the identification of the major political 
tradition of the larger community’, our contribution aims at analysing how neo-fascist 
political traditions could be reflected in recent voting trajectories. 
The abovementioned empirical research on the topic presents at least two draw-
backs: first, almost all the studies aiming to explain the new Lega’s geographical 
trajectories of success with the scattered neo-fascist legacy of the context are mainly ag-
gregate analyses, based on official electoral data at the municipality or provincial level, 
over a small part of the territory (Mancosu, 2015; Mancosu and Ladini, 2018). This ap-
proach, which in addition does not take into account southern regions that saw a massive 
increase in support for the Lega in 2019, keeps open concerns regarding the inference to 
the entire part of the country exposed to the party’s outbreak and exposes these studies to 
issues of ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950). In other words, just by looking at the aggre-
gate, we do not have the ‘smoking gun’ of the effect of the context on individual attitudes 
and behaviours. 
2.3. Hypotheses 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we assess whether contextual characteristics are 
able to explain, by means of an aggregate measure, the variance of likelihood to vote for 
the Lega explicitly at the individual level, net of several other individual-level controls. 
Second, we extend previous analyses (focusing on a few regions) to the entire country, by 
looking in particular at central and southern regions, in which the Lega was an (almost) 
irrelevant competitor before Salvini’s leadership, and in which the increase of consen-
sus has been more impressive in relative terms. These regions also made up the most 
important basin of the MSI during the First Republic (see Ignazi, 1998), leading to a more 
precise test of our theoretical framework. In addition, while the diffusion of Lega Nord 
in northern regions took place in a period in which the party had ethno-regionalist con-
notations, the unprecedented diffusion of the Lega beyond its strongholds coincided 
with the shift of the party to nationalistic and more radical right-wing positions. In this 
respect, we hypothesize that the effect of MSI strength on individual support for the Lega 
will be stronger in central and southern regions. The first hypothesis will thus read as 
follows:  
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H1. Contextual levels of the neo-fascist minority are positively associated with in-
dividual propensities to vote for the Lega in the 2019 European elections, especially 
in the centre-south. 
As an additional drawback, previous studies do not take into account the transfor-
mation of the extreme right-wing parties in the past decades. A correlation between the 
strength of the Lega (either at the aggregate or individual level) in recent elections and 
the permeability of the context to the MSI, per se, does not automatically lead to a corrob-
oration of the mechanism depicted above. As stressed in the literature, indeed, the neo-
fascist right has undergone several vicissitudes since the end of the First and the begin-
ning of the Second Republic (see Ignazi, 1998). In 1993, the MSI leadership abandoned 
the ideological references to fascism (which clearly characterized the MSI during the 
First Republic), by dissolving the old party and founding Alleanza Nazionale, a more 
moderate party that aimed at qualifying itself as a potential governing party. The ideo-
logical shift, similar to the one that invested the centre-left parties in the same period, 
allowed this new party to receive 5 million votes at its first appearance in the 1994 elec-
tions, almost doubling the historical best performance of the MSI (almost 3 million votes 
in 1972). However, the relationship between the two parties remained quite strong. For 
instance, the municipal-level correlation between the Movimento Sociale Italiano in 
1976 and Alleanza Nazionale in 2001 – two periods in which the voting percentage for 
the parties was about one percentage point higher than their average – is indeed equal to 
.54 (authors’ analysis). It is thus possible that the places in which the MSI was strong 
became progressively less extreme, aided, in this process, by the decreasing extremism 
of the political entrepreneur which they referred to. The effect of the neo-fascist tradi-
tion on the Lega must thus be discounted by the effect of a subsequent, and less extreme 
political entrepreneur that might have mitigated the original extreme ideological tenet 
of MSI in the context. The second hypothesis will thus read as follows: 
H2. Contextual levels of the neo-fascist minority in the centre-south are positively 
associated with individual propensities to vote for the Lega in the 2019 European 
elections, irrespective of the contextual performance of Alleanza Nazionale during 
the Second Republic. 
3. Data and methods 
To test our hypotheses, we employed a survey carried out in Italy before the 2019 Euro-
pean elections (from 13 March to 15 May, 2019). Overall, 11,063 respondents from an 
opt-in panel of a private company (SWG) were interviewed through the CAWI (Com-
puter Assisted Web Interviewing) mode. The survey contains questions referring to the 
socio-demographic, attitudinal, and behavioural characteristics of the respondents. In 
addition, the survey contains information on the municipality in which the respondents 
live. This piece of information is employed here to link the individual dataset with the 
election results extracted from the official database of the Italian Ministry of the Inte-
rior. In particular, the voting percentages for the Movimento Sociale Italiano in 19762 
 
2 The distribution of the voting percentages for the MSI in the 1976 national elections by geographical area 
are reported in Appendix 1. To take into account possible bias due to the extreme values of the MSI 
strength in some municipalities, we also attempted to fit the same models without these extreme values. 
Results, available on request, are substantially equal to those presented in this article. 
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and Alleanza Nazionale in 2001 at the municipality level have been matched with every 
respondent declaring a non-missing municipality of residence.  
In this paper, we present four different models with the aim of providing consistent 
empirical evidence to back our hypotheses. The dependent variable is the individual pro-
pensity to vote for the Lega, measured by means of a 0-10 scale in which the respondents 
express the likelihood of their voting for the party, with 0 meaning ‘0% likelihood’ and 
10 meaning ‘100% likelihood’ (for more information on the measure see van der Eijk et 
al., 2006). The first model, fitted only on respondents coming from the northern regions 
(northeast and northwest), explains the variation of the propensity to vote for the Lega 
conditional to the level of support for the MSI at the municipal level in 1976. The second 
model also includes the share of votes for Alleanza Nazionale at the municipal level as 
control variable. In this way, we are able to assess whether the propensities to vote for the 
Lega are associated with the permeability to the neo-fascist tradition of the context in 
which people live, controlling for the level of the (more moderate) heir to this tradition 
in a subsequent election (Alleanza Nazionale). The same two models are fitted only on 
the respondents living in central and southern regions (third and fourth model)3. All the 
models also include a set of individual-level control variables: gender, age group (six cat-
egories: <25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and more), educational level (three categories: 
primary, secondary, and tertiary), perceived wealth (five categories: wealthy, living eas-
ily, living with difficulties, living with huge difficulties, poor), and left-right self-
placement on a 0-10 scale recoded in 6 categories (left: 0-1; centre-left: 2-3; centre: 4-6; 
centre-right: 7-8; right: 9-10; refused to locate).4 According to our hypotheses, we could 
expect that the coefficient of MSI will be positive and significant in the centre-south of 
the country, net of control variables. 
To control for the possible inflation of standard errors because of the hierarchical 
structure of the data, we employ linear multilevel random-intercept regression models 
(Snijders and Boskers, 1999). This multilevel approach has some antecedents in the 
study of Italian electoral behaviour aimed at analysing the role of territorial political tra-
ditions on vote choice (Vezzoni, 2008). To further take into account the context at a 
lower level of specification, all the models are fitted with a fixed-effect control that indi-
cates the Istat geographical area to which the respondent belongs. 
4. Results 
Table 2 shows the coefficients for the four multilevel regression models, fitted on re-
spondents living in the northern (Model 1 and 2) and central-southern (Model 3 and 4) 
regions.  
 
3 To stress the differences in voting behaviour for the League between north and centre-south we em-
ployed a separated model approach instead of estimating a single pooled model with an interaction 
between MSI strength and a dichotomous north/centre-south variable. This choice is explained by both 
theoretical and methodological reasons: first, insofar as we deal with the geographically scattered support 
for the Lega, subdividing north and centre-south signals that we are dealing with two different subna-
tional contexts that should be treated in different ways (see Passarelli and Tuorto, 2012). Second, by 
applying a two-model approach, we provide a more conservative interpretation of the effects that, in this 
way are estimated separately in the two subnational contexts (a pooled approach would indeed provide a 
weighted average of the control variables’ effects without taking into account geographical specificities). 
4 All the question wordings can be found in Appendix 2. 
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With regard to the control variables, although we can detect some differences be-
tween the models, results are in line with previous literature (Passarelli and Tuorto, 
2018). All over the country, the propensities to vote for the Lega are far higher among 
respondents with a low educational level, whose average value is more than one point 
higher than tertiary educated ones, both in northern and central-southern regions. 
Table 2. Multilevel linear regression models to study the propensity to vote for the Lega 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 North only North only Centre-south only Centre-south only 
Indep. Variables Lega PTV Lega PTV Lega PTV Lega PTV 
                  
MSI municipal level 
(1976) -0.00 (0.04) 0.03 (0.06) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 
         
AN municipal level 
(2001)   -0.03 (0.03)   -0.01 (0.02) 
         
Gender: Female 0.33*** (0.09) 0.32*** (0.09) 0.26*** (0.09) 0.27*** (0.09) 
         
Age: 25-34 (ref. <25) 0.04 (0.22) 0.03 (0.22) -0.22 (0.22) -0.22 (0.22) 
35-44 0.25 (0.21) 0.25 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 0.18 (0.21) 
45-54 0.57*** (0.21) 0.57*** (0.21) 0.22 (0.21) 0.22 (0.21) 
55-64 0.02 (0.21) 0.02 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) -0.03 (0.21) 
>64 -0.19 (0.20) -0.19 (0.20) -0.43** (0.20) -0.43** (0.20) 
         
Education level: Sec-
ondary (ref. Primary) -0.23 (0.18) -0.23 (0.18) -0.58*** (0.18) -0.58*** (0.18) 
Tertiary -1.09*** (0.19) -1.09*** (0.19) -1.39*** (0.19) -1.39*** (0.19) 
         
Income: I can live 
easily (ref. I’m wealthy) -0.04 (0.34) -0.04 (0.34) -0.47 (0.36) -0.47 (0.36) 
I have difficulties 0.35 (0.35) 0.35 (0.35) -0.56 (0.36) -0.56 (0.36) 
I have huge difficulties 0.79** (0.37) 0.80** (0.37) -0.56 (0.38) -0.56 (0.38) 
I feel poor 0.65 (0.43) 0.65 (0.43) -0.07 (0.41) -0.07 (0.41) 
         
Left-right s-p: Centre-
right (ref. Right) -1.07*** (0.19) -1.07*** (0.19) -0.86*** (0.20) -0.86*** (0.20) 
Centre -3.56*** (0.22) -3.57*** (0.22) -2.28*** (0.22) -2.28*** (0.22) 
Centre-left -6.30*** (0.18) -6.30*** (0.18) -5.01*** (0.18) -5.01*** (0.18) 
Left -6.86*** (0.19) -6.86*** (0.19) -5.37*** (0.19) -5.37*** (0.19) 
Not located -4.73*** (0.19) -4.74*** (0.19) -3.52*** (0.19) -3.52*** (0.19) 
         
Constant 7.97*** (0.46) 8.15*** (0.49) 7.75*** (0.48) 7.84*** (0.55) 
Level-2 variance 0.17** (0.08) 0.17** (0.08) 0.24*** (0.07) 0.24*** (0.07) 
Level-1 variance 1.08*** (0.01) 1.08*** (0.01) 1.13*** (0.01) 1.13*** (0.01) 
         
Observations 4,467 4,467 5,121 5,121 
Number of groups 1,053 1,053 922 922 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (the models contain fixed effect for the geographical area 
– coefficients not shown). 
When looking at gender, women present on average a propensity to vote for the Lega 
which is 0.3 higher than men. Concerning age groups, the analysis shows that, in the 
south, older voters (age > 64) have the lowest propensity to vote for the Lega, In the north, 
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45-54 year old individuals are more likely to choose the Lega than the youngest ones. As 
expected, individuals who locate themselves at the extreme right pole of the left-right 
scale had the highest propensity to vote for the Lega in the 2019 European elections. In 
line with the argument on the radicalization of the Lega, they are even significantly more 
supportive of the party compared to respondents locating themselves on the centre-
right. Individual economic conditions seem to be associated with a preference for the 
Lega only in the north, with people with difficulties having a higher propensity to vote 
for the party. 
Figure 1. Predicted propensities to vote for the Lega according to the different levels of MSI at the mu-
nicipal level in 1976 (95% confidence intervals) – centre-south only, Model 4 predictions 
 
Our two substantively relevant independent variables are, as stressed above, the 
municipal-level strength of the MSI in 1976, and the level of the less extreme heir to this 
party, Alleanza Nazionale, about twenty years before the 2019 elections. Results seem to 
support our hypotheses. The association between the strength of the MSI in the munici-
pality and the propensity to vote for the Lega in 2019 is positive and significant, but only 
in the south. In the north, the traditional stronghold of the party, we find no correlation 
between MSI performance and individual support for the Lega. This is further proof of 
the fact that the neo-fascist explanation of party trajectories can be an explanation only 
in the centre-south of the country.  
Another relevant result is that this outcome is stable even when controlling for the 
municipal levels of Alleanza Nazionale, the less extreme heir to the MSI, which turns out 
to be non-significant in explaining the variation in the propensity to vote for the Lega.5 
 
5 Since the two variables might present issues of multicollinearity, we performed a variance inflation fac-
tor (VIF) test on the model. In both north and centre-south models, the VIF score of MSI and AN variables 
are around 2, a value that reassures us regarding the absence of multicollinearity issues (in general, a VIF 
value over 5 or 10 starts to be worrisome; see Hair et al., 2010). 
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An analysis of the magnitude of the effects is enlightening as to the relevance of the 
MSI effect in shaping voters’ attitudes and behaviours. As figure 1 shows, if we select the 
central 90% of the distribution of our independent variable, the predicted propensity to 
vote for the Lega (on a 0-10 scale) is equal to 2.8 when people live in a municipality in 
which the share of votes for the MSI was around 2%. Instead, when people exposed to ar-
eas which are more permeable to the neo-fascist minority (level of MSI in 1976 equal to 
14% on valid votes), their average propensity to vote is 0.8 points higher, equal to 3.6. 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
This paper aims to test the relevance of one possible explanation for the success of the 
Lega in the 2019 European elections in Italy, by focusing especially on central and south-
ern regions where the consensus for the Lega was irrelevant before Matteo Salvini’s 
leadership. To do so, we moved from the previous literature (see Mancosu, 2015; Man-
cosu and Ladini, 2018) by looking at the persistence of the neo-fascist political tradition 
in the vote for the new Lega. According to this view, one of the communication strategies 
of Salvini started from the standpoint that support for the Lega could expand by exploit-
ing a potential national basin of extreme right-wing voters who were, if not contiguous, 
not reluctant to a classical set of neo-fascist claims (which include Ventennio nostalgia, 
a supremacist view of the Italian cultural and ethnic milieux, and a general preference 
for a ‘strong leader’ figure). Some of the rhetoric in the communication strategy of the 
Lega’s leader followed this general trend and progressively shifted its claims and politi-
cal action to the extreme right of the political spectrum and to the centre-south as 
regards the geographical diffusion trajectories. Previous research aimed at finding an as-
sociation between the geographical scattering of the Lega in the last 4-5 years and the 
contexts in which the extreme right minority was stronger, were mainly based on aggre-
gate data – a strategy that does not allow us to clearly identify causal mechanisms.  
In this paper, we aimed to explain the electoral success of the Lega in 2019 by ex-
plaining the individual variation of propensities to vote with levels of the neo-fascist 
minority in the First Republic – measured by means of the municipal strength of the Mo-
vimento Sociale Italiano. The mechanism hypothesized here can be identified with a 
form of behavioural path dependence (Acharya et al., 2018) that argues that contexts 
more open to accepting a strong neo-fascist minority are those in which more extreme 
ideas can spread, even if more than forty years have passed. 
The analyses presented here provide empirical evidence towards our hypotheses, by 
showing a significant association between support for the MSI and the propensity to vote 
for the new Lega, but only in those areas where the Lega was almost absent before Sal-
vini’s leadership. We think that our results can be relevant in showing the persistence of 
political attitudes over time. Similarly to other cases of behavioural path dependence 
shown above, the attitudes of the neo-fascist minority at the local level which were pre-
sent, and sometimes relevant, during the whole of the First Republic, show up again with 
the exploits and communication shift of the new Lega, after a period in which they have 
been hidden. 
These results must be evaluated by considering at least two caveats. The first one is 
that results do not show that ‘Lega voters are neo-fascists’, nor that ‘neo-fascists mas-
sively vote for the Lega’; rather, what we show here is that people in contexts in which a 
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neo-fascist minority were particularly present might have been socialized in a political 
context in which, among other things, shreds of the ideology were present. It is not nec-
essary for people voting nowadays for the Lega to accept the complete set of ideological 
tenets of neo-fascism; nor do they need to completely understand all the consequences 
of the ideological structure, which, by the way, has been historically extremely vague and 
foggy. In addition, the relationship between the MSI’s prevalence and the propensity to 
vote for the Lega allows us to explain only a part of the success of the party in the centre-
south, which can also be accounted for by more recent trends, such as the immigration 
and economic crises (see Albertazzi et al., 2018). 
Finally, our results only indirectly argue that the trigger of the correlation that we 
see is the shift of Salvini’s communication. Although previous studies stressed that the 
correlation between the neo-fascist legacy and the trajectories of diffusion of the Lega 
are related only after the advent of Salvini as leader of the party, we do not present any 
evidence relating to this (crucial) point. Future research should aim at better identifying 
the path dependence mechanism – by means, for instance, of panel data. 
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Appendixes 
Appendix 1. Voting percentages for the Movimento Sociale Italiano in 1976 national elections 
Geographical area MSI 1976 
Northwest 3.8 
Northeast 3.4 
Centre 6.3 
South 9.4 
Islands 10.1 
Italy 6.1 
Note: Within the centre, in Lazio – the only region of the macroarea not belonging to the so called ‘red zone’ – the voting per-
centage for the MSI was equal to 9.5. 
 
Appendix 2. Question wording (authors’ translation)  
Dependent variable 
Propensity to vote for the Lega: What is the likelihood that you will vote for the Lega in the 
upcoming European elections? 
1. not at all likely — 11. totally likely 
(variable rescaled on a 0-10 scale in the analyses) 
Independent variables 
Gender: you are... 
1. Male 
2. Female 
Age: Age class at 6 – pre-coded in the dataset. 
1. <25 
2. 25-34 
3. 35-44 
4. 45-54 
5. 55-64 
6. >64 
Education level – pre-coded in the dataset 
1. Primary 
2. Secondary 
3. Tertiary 
Your income allows you to live... 
1. I’m wealthy 
2. I can live easily 
3. I have difficulties 
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4. I have huge difficulties 
5. I feel poor 
Politically, you would locate yourself more on the... – pre-coded in the dataset 
1. Right 
2. Centre-right 
3. Centre 
4. Centre-left 
5. Left 
6. I would not locate myself 
Geographical area – pre-coded in the dataset 
1. Northwest 
2. Northeast 
3. Centre 
4. South 
5. Islands 
